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WTO constitutional 
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and decision making
by John H Jackson
The controversy surrounding the World Trade Organisation's Ministerial 
Conference in Seattle at the end of last year focused public attention on the 
workings of the WTO. The author looks at the background and history of the 
WTO, as well as procedures for dispute settlement among nations, in an 
article written before the events at Seattle.
O n January 1, 1995, a new international economic organisation came into being, resulting from the lengthy, extensive and complex Uruguay Round trade 
negotiation in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). The Uruguay Round Agreement of the 
GATT/WTO has been described as 'the most important event in 
recent economic history.' In addition, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) is described as the 'central international 
economic institution', 1 and nations are becoming increasingly 
engaged with the detailed processes of the WTO, especially its 
dispute settlement procedure. However, the WTO Agreement, 
including all of its elaborate annexes, is probably fully understood 
by no nation which has accepted it, including some of the richest 
and most powerful trading nations that are members. 2
This article looks at the first three years' experience under the 
new organisation and its 'constitution'. At this point in time, 
appraisals of the launch and early experience of the WTO are 
almost uniformly optimistic and approving. The new 
organisation has had a successful launch, it has engaged in a
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number of different activities (not all of which have individually 
been successful), and it has put into practice a quite remarkable 
set of new procedures for dispute settlement among nations 
concerning trade matters.
Therefore, it is worthwhile to try to draw some conclusions 
about this early experience and what it might portend for the 
future. This is the purpose of this article which intends, 
furthermore, to put forward some generalisations or tentative 
hypotheses about the meaning and potential of these early years 
of experience. The article will do this in four parts. First, it will 
provide a brief overview of the history, background, and 
'landscape' of the new organisation. It illustrates the continuity 
from its predecessor, the GATT, and some of the major 
problems of the GATT and how the Uruguay Round negotiators 
approached those problems in developing the new organisation 
and the extraordinarily extensive treaty of the Uruguay Round.
The second part examines the jurisprudence of the new 
organisation during the early years up to March 1998. A brief 
overview of the dispute settlement cases will be presented, along 
with some indications of the potential meaning of those cases 
and some hypotheses about the directions of the new Appellate 
Body. The third part of this article discusses some of the 
emerging constitutional problems, particularly questions about 
allocation of power within the organisation, and between the 
organisation and the member states. Particular attention will be 
given to the potential ability or inability of the organisation to 
cope with some of the many problems of 'globalisation' which 
are emerging. Finally, this article will suggest some possible 
solutions or partial solutions to some problems, and draw some 
conclusions and prognoses.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY, 
BACKGROUND AND 'LANDSCAPE' OF THE 
WTO
Looking back over the 1946 94 history of the GATT allows 
one to reflect on how surprising it was that this relatively feeble 
institution with many 'birth defects' managed to play such a 
significant role for almost five decades. It certainly was far more 
successful than could have been fairly predicted in the late 1940s.
World economic developments pushed The GATT to a 
central role during the past few decades. The growing economic 
interdependence of the world has been increasingly commented 
upon. Events that occur halfway around the world have a 
powerful influence on the other side of the globe. Armed 
conflict and social unrest in the Middle East affect the farmers 
in Iowa and France and the auto workers in Michigan and 
Germany. Interest rate decisions in Washington have a profound 
influence on the external debt of many countries of the world 
which, in turn, affects their ability to purchase goods made in 
industrial countries and their ability to provide economic 
advancement to their citizenry. Environmental problems have
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obvious cross-border effects. More and more frequently, 
government leaders find their freedom of action circumscribed
O
because of the impact of external economic factors on their 
national economies.
One of the interesting and certainly more controversial 
aspects of the GATT as an institution was its dispute-settlement 
mechanism. This mechanism was unique. It was also flawed, due 
in part to the troubled beginnings of the GATT. ^et these 
procedures worked better than expected, and some could argue 
that in fact they worked better than those of the World Court 
and many other international dispute procedures. A number of 
interesting policy questions are raised by the experience of the 
procedure, not least of which is the question about what should 
be the fundamental objective of the system   to solve the instant 
dispute (by conciliation, obfuscation, power threats, or 
otherwise), or to promote certain longer-term systemic goals 
such as predictability and stability' of interpretations of treaty 
text.
Even though some argued that GATT Dispute Settlement was 
merely a facilitation of negotiations designed to reach a 
settlement, the original intention was tor GATT to be placed in 
the institutional setting of the International Trade Organisation 
(ITO). The draft ITO Charter called tor a rigorous dispute- 
settlement procedure which contemplated effective use of 
arbitration (not always mandatory, however) and even appeal to 
the World Court in some circumstances. Clair Wilcox, Vice- 
Chair man of the US Delegation to the Havana Conference, 
regards the possibility of suspending trade concessions under 
this procedure as:
' . . . a metnod* o^ restoring a ba/ance o^ benefits and* 
tnat, Jor any reason, may naye been disturbed". Jt is nownere described" 
(» a pena/ty to be imposed" on member; wVio may Wo/ate tneir 
ob/iaafions or a; a sanction to injure tnaf rne.se oblations wi// be 
observed". ^ut even tnouan it is not so re^ard"ed", if M?7/ operate in jacf as 
a sanction and" a penalty. '
He further notes the procedure for obtaining a World Court 
opinion on the law involved in a dispute, and says, V^ basis is thus 
provided for the development of a body of international law to 
govern trade relationships.'
When one reflects on the almost fifty years of pre-WTO 
history of the GATT dispute settlement process, some 
generalisations seem both apparent and quite remarkable. With 
very meagre treaty language as a start, plus divergent alternative 
views about the policy goals of the system, the GATT, like so 
many human institutions, to some extent took on a life of its 
own. Both as to the dispute procedures (a shift from working 
parties to panels), and as to the substantive focus of the system 
(a shift from general ambiguous ideas about 'nullification or 
impairment/ to more analytical or 'legalistic' approaches to 
interpret rules of treaty obligation, the GATT panel procedure 
evolved toward more rule orientation.
The GATT dispute settlement process became admired 
enough that various trade policy interests sought to bring their 
subjects under it. This was one of the motivations which led both 
the intellectual property interests and the services trade interests 
to urge those subjects to be included in the Uruguay Round. The 
Uruguay Round results, of course, apply the new Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) procedures to those subjects.
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WTO 
EARLY YEARS
/A J The^r$(^ear$ o^ fAe new WTO diapufe 
procedures
The WTO Secretariat listings of 30 March 1998 show that 
120 cases have been brought under the new procedures. This is 
a remarkable increase, about threefold, over the rate of cases 
under the GATT. This number of cases may give various 
indications. First, it represents a great deal of confidence by the 
nation-state members of the WTO in the new procedure. 
Second, members are perhaps testing the new procedure and 
trying it out by bringing cases. Third, perhaps the new texts of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements have sufficient ambiguity (fairly 
typical at the beginning of practice under a treaty text) that they 
engender more cases. And, finally, perhaps it is a combination of 
all these factors.
One of the more optimistic indicia of the figures is the 
relatively large number of settlements that are apparently 
occurring. This could be an indication that the procedures are 
enhancing and inducing settlements, and that these settlements
o o '
are consistent with the 'rule orientation' principles of the 
procedures. Governments start a procedure, and then as the 
procedure advances more becomes known about the case. At 
some point, the jurisprudence will suggest to the participants 
the likely outcome of the case and this will induce settlement, 
consistent with the rules as interpreted in prior cases. Thus the 
jurisprudence assists the governments in coming to agreement 
about their case, consistent with the rules themselves.
Another optimistic indication is the general spirit of 
compliance with the result of the dispute settlement 
procedures. Even the major powers have all indicated that they 
will comply with the mandates of the Dispute Settlement reports 
when they are finalised and formally adopted (which is virtually 
automatic). Naturally, grumblings and complaints, particularly 
by special interests within societies, about the rulings of the 
panels and the Appellate Body are expected to exist. 
Nevertheless, the author has attended meetings where officials 
from the major participating members in the WTO have all 
indicated that their governments intend to comply with the 
results of holdings against their governments. So far, there seems
o o o '
to be no exception to this spirit of compliance, although the 
question of what is appropriate 'compliance' is controversial 
from time to time.
Another interesting facet of the cases brought so far is the 
much higher amount of participation by developing countries. 
These countries have brought a number of the cases themselves, 
even against some of the big industrial countries (with rather 
satisfying wins). In addition, for virtually the first time in 
GATT/WTO history, developing countries have even brought 
cases against other developing countries.
J/.2 Some abouf (Ae
The addition of the right to appeal to an Appellate Body made 
up of a permanent cadre (a roster of seven, sitting in divisions of 
three), in conjunction with the automaticity of approval of panel 
reports, has already had a very profound impact on the world 
trading system as embodied in the GATT and WTO.^ Some of
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these impacts will be the focus of the next sub-section. For this 
sub-section, however, it is of considerable interest to examine 
the characteristics and general approaches of the nine or ten 
reports made available by the Appellate Body divisions.
First, the Appellate Body has made it reasonably clear that 
general international law is relevant and applies in the case of the 
WTO and its treaty annexes, including the GATT. In the past 
there has been some question about this, with certain parties 
arguing that the GATT was a 'separate regime,' in some way 
insulated from the general body of international law. The
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Appellate Body has made it quite clear that this is not the case; 
it has made reference to general international law principles, 
particularly as embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, which the Appellate Body calls upon for principles of 
treaty interpretation.
The Appellate Body also has produced reports which, while 
not entirely free of possible error, have been very carefully 
crafted. These reports give the strong impression of opinions 
that judicial institutions in many legal systems follow. The 
Appellate Body reasoning has been quite thorough, and generally 
careful (especially considering the very short time limits within 
which they have to operate). It has also been quite independent 
and impartial, for it is difficult to detect nationality influence on 
the Appellate Body. There is no indication of particular 
authorship of any part of an Appellate Body report and no 
provision for dissenting opinions. Thus, an Appellate Body 
report is only attributed generally to the three members of the 
roster which sat in the division. This makes the Appellate Body 
work more 'juridical,' or, put differently, 'legalistic' in tenor than 
before in the GATT, and indeed more so than in many, if not 
most, international tribunals.
The second characteristic that seems to be emerging from the 
jurisprudence with the Appellate Body is a more deferential 
attitude towards national government decisions (or, in other 
words, more deference to national 'sovereignty'), than 
sometimes has been the case for the first-level panels or the 
panels under GATT. In some sense, therefore, the Appellate 
Body has been exercising more 'judicial restraint' and has been 
more hesitant to develop new ideas of interpreting the treaty 
language than sometimes has been the case in the first-level 
panels themselves. Although there is no clear explanation for this 
attitude of the Appellate Body, this may be attributed, 
nevertheless, to the fact that the Appellate Body roster contains 
relatively few GATT specialists. The Appellate Body, which 
generally is considered to have outstanding members, has 
members that are more 'generalist' than one would typically find 
on the first-level panels or in the GATT panels in previous years. 
This could be a very good omen, because the care andJ o
appropriate deference to national decisions may be a significant 
factor in the long-run general acceptance of the work of the
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WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) among a great variety and 
large number of nations of the world.
11.3 The role of the WTO dispute settlement system in 
the New World trading framework
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, the dispute 
settlement system under the new procedures is having a 
profound impact on the world trade system. In particular, 
diplomats find themselves in new territory. Rather than
operating in what is thoroughly a 'negotiating atmosphere', 
diplomats find themselves acting as lawyers, or relying on 
lawyers, much more heavily than before, and much more heavily 
than some of them would like. The dispute settlement 
procedure itself becomes part of the negotiating tactics for 
various Dispute Settlement attempts. To this end, reference is 
frequently made in the media to 'nation A' arguing against 
'nation BY measures, and 'threatening to bring a case in the 
WTO' if it does not get the matter resolved. The negotiations 
concerning potential and threatened US action against Japanese 
automobile imports is a case in point, where the option to bring 
the case in the WTO apparently worked in a way that was 
deemed by the Japanese appropriately favourable to their 
negotiation (negotiating) position. In another case, Costa Rica, 
small as it is, brought a case against the giant of the north   the 
US   concerning import quotas in the US against the 
importation of cotton underwear and some other textile 
products. Costa Rica won the case, both at the first level and on 
appeal   an outcome that is quite an eye-opener.
One interesting set of developments that has been evolving, 
first of all under the GATT and now under the WTO, is the 
participation of private attorneys who are retained by 
governments involved in the WTO dispute settlement process. 
Small governments, in particular, often do not have in-house 
expertise that is adequate to handle some of the complex cases 
(or even some of the simple cases) which are finding their way 
into the WTO dispute settlement arena. Such states are put at a 
substantial disadvantage against large entities like the US or the 
European Community which have such in-house expertise. 
These smaller states consequently have in some circumstances 
been eager to retain the services of private attorneys, usually 
Europeans or Americans. But there has been some objection 
made, most often by the US, to the practice. During the course 
of the last year, developments seem to have moved very 
substantially in the direction of permitting this practice of 
governments retaining private attorneys, with certain 
limitations. Although this represents a commendable move, it 
will nevertheless necessitate a certain amount of careful thinking 
about the role and relationship of the private attorneys vis-a-vis 
their government clients, and vis-a-vis the WTO system. It will 
be wise for the DSB or other appropriate bodies to develop 
certain standards and ethical rules, perhaps including conflict- 
of-interest rules as well as confidentiality rules, which would 
generally be recommended to governments as part of the
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contract they use to retain attorneys. If this matter receives 
appropriate attention, it will facilitate the evolution of the 
appropriate practices and documents in this respect.
//. EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF 
THE WTO
Almost every human institution has to face the task of how to 
evolve and change in the face of conditions and circumstances 
not originally considered when the institution was set up. This is 
most certainly true in respect to the original GATT, and now in 
the case of the WTO. With the fast-paced change of a globalising 
economy, the WTO will necessarily have to cope with new 
factors, new policies, and new subject matters. If it fails to do 
that, it will sooner or later, faster or more gradually, be 
'marginalised.' This could be very detrimental to the broader 
multilateral approach to international economic relations,
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pushing nations to solve their problems through regional 
arrangements, bilateral arrangements, and even unilateral 
actions. Although these forms other than multilateral can have an
o
appropriate role and also can be constructive innovators for the 
world trading system, they also run considerable additional risks 
of ignoring key components of, and the diversity of, societies and 
societal policies that exist in the world. In other words, they run 
a high risk of generating significant disputes and rancour among 
nations, which can inhibit or debilitate the advantages of co- 
operation otherwise hoped for under the multilateral system.
In addition, in the case of human institutions and particularly 
treaty negotiations involving over 130 participating nations or 
entities, gaps and considerable ambiguities in many places in the 
treaty language are inevitable. These shortcomings are beginning 
to emerge in the discussions and dispute settlement proceedings 
of the WTO. They seem to be particularly significant in the 
context of the new issue texts, namely GATS for services and 
TRIPS for intellectual property. However, even concerning the 
traditional GATT text itself, there are ongoing ambiguity 
problems that are calling for new approaches. For example, an 
evolution in thinking about the obligations of Article IIIo o
(national treatment) as affected and perhaps embellished by 
other texts in the context of GATT in Annex IA, such as the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, etc., is 
currently witnessed. Along the same lines, a number of other 
newer subjects have been suggested for allocation to co- 
operative mechanisms in the WTO context. These include 
questions about competition policy, investment rules, human 
rights issues, environment in trade, labour standards issues, 
sanctions (unilateral or otherwise) to enforce some of these 
policies, and also questions of threat to peace and arms control. 
The inventory of potential new issues does not stop there.
The crucial question remains, however, how will the WTO 
solve or attempt to solve some of these issues? The First 
Ministerial, held at Singapore in 1996, faced some of these 
questions. Many conclude that the results of that meeting were 
not terribly innovative in relation to ways to cope with new 
issues. Obviously, the ministers felt both the legal constraints of 
the WTO 'charter,' and political as well as economic constraints 
of attitudes of constituents in a number of different societies. 
The issues needing resolution could be broadly grouped into two 
categories: (1) substantively new issues (such as some of those 
discussed or listed above), but also (2) a number of procedural 
or arguably interstitial issues for the organisation. It is clear, for 
example, that a variety of the procedures of the dispute 
settlement process (particularly its relation to the text of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding), as well as other procedures 
regarding decision-making, waivers, new accessions, are being
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scrutinised and various suggestions for improvement are being 
put on the table. With respect to dispute settlement, most are 
aware that the treaty text itself calls for a review during the 
calendar year 1998, now ensuing.
In considering and dealing with the above-named issues in the 
current WTO institutional framework, it has to be recognised at 
the outset that there is a delicate interplay between the dispute 
settlement process on the one hand, and the possibilities or 
difficulties of negotiating new treaty texts or making decisions by 
the organisation that are authorised by the Uruguay Round 
treaty text, on the other hand. In this context, the possibilities of
negotiating new text or making decisions pursuant to explicit 
authority of the WTO 'charter' are clearly quite constrained. In 
the last months of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the 
diplomatic representatives at the negotiation felt it was 
important to build in a number of 'checks and balances' in the 
WTO charter, to constrain decision making by the international 
institution which would be too 'intrusive on sovereignty'. Thus, 
the decision-making clauses of Article IX and the amendingo o
clauses of Article X established a number of limitations on what 
the membership of the WTO can do. The amending procedures 
are probably at least as difficult as those that existed under the 
GATT 5 Under the GATT, it was perceived by the time of the 
Tokyo Round in the 1970s that amendments were virtually 
impossible, so the Contracting Parties developed the technique 
of 'side agreements'. The theory of the WTO was to avoid this 
'GATT a la carte' approach and pursue a 'single agreement' 
approach. Attitudes toward that continue to exist.
Apart from formal amendments, one can look at the powers 
concerning decisions, waivers and formal interpretations. 
Substantial constraints do exist, however, in each of these avenues. 
Decision-making (at least as a fallback from attempts to achieve 
consensus) is generally ruled by a majority-vote system. However, 
there is language in the WTO charter (Article IX, paragraph 3), as 
well as the long practice under the GATT, that suggests that 
decisions cannot be used to impose new obligations on members. 
Waivers were sometimes used in the GATT as ways to innovate 
and adjust to new circumstances. This process, however, fell into 
disrepute and caused the negotiators to develop Uruguay Round 
texts that quite constrained the use of waivers. In particular, such 
a constraint concerned duration of waivers subjecting them, 
thereby, to explicit revocation authorities. The GATT had no 
formal provision regarding 'interpretation', and thus the GATT 
panels probably enjoyed greater scope for setting forth 
interpretations that would ultimately become embedded in the 
GATT practice and even subsequently negotiated treaty language. 
However, the WTO addresses this issue of formal interpretations 
directly, imposing a very stringent voting requirement of three- 
fourths of the total membership. Since it is often observed that a 
quarter of the WTO membership is not present at key meetings, 
one can see that the formal interpretation process is not an easy 
one to achieve.
Given these various constraints, it would be understandable if 
there was a temptation to try to use the dispute settlement process 
and the general conclusions of the panel reports regarding 
interpretation of many of the treaty clauses which have ambiguity 
or gaps. However, the Dispute Settlement Understanding itself in 
Article 3, paragraph 2, limits proceeding in this direction, by 
saying 'Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to 
or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements.' As suggested in Part II above, the emerging attitudes 
of the Appellate Body reports seem to reinforce a policy of 
considerable deference to national government decision making, 
possibly as a matter of 'judicial restraint' ideas such as that quoted 
from the DSU Article 3, and otherwise expressed by various 
countries that fear too much intrusion on 'sovereignty' (whatever 
that means). The provision of an explicit power of 'formal 
interpretation' with a supermajority requirement in the WTO 
charter also arguably constrains the scope into which the dispute 
setdement system can push the idea of its report rulings and 
recommendations becoming 'definitive'.
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In short, there are indications that the dispute settlement 
system cannot and should not carry much of the weight of 
formulating new rules either by way of filling gaps in the existing 
agreements, or by setting forth norms which carry the 
organisation into totally new territory, such as competition 
policy or labour standards. In addition, as noted above, there arc 
many procedural questions. Some of the procedures under the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding are now being questioned. 
Various suggestions are coming forward, and some lists ofoo o '
proposals tor change exceed 60 or 80 items or suggestions. ManvII o oo ,
of these suggestions are reasonable 'fine tuning/ withoutOo o
dramatic consequence to the system. But even the fine-tuning 
can be difficult to achieve given some of the constraints on 
decision-making. One of the geniuses of the GATT and its
o o
history was its ability to evolve partly through trial and error and 
practice. Indeed the dispute settlement under GATT evolved 
over four decades quite dramatically   with such concepts as 
'prima facie nullification', or the use of 'panels' instead of 
'working parties', becoming gradually embedded in the process 
  and under the Tokyo Round understanding on dispute 
settlement became 'definitive' by consensus action of the 
contracting parties.
But the language of the DSU (as well as the WTO 'charter') 
seems to greatly constrain some of this approach compared to 
the GATT. DSU Article 2, paragraph 4, states 'Where the rules 
and procedures of this understanding provide for the DSB to 
take a decision, it shall do so by consensus.' The definition of 
consensus is then supplied in a footnote, and although not 
identical with 'unanimity', provides that an objecting member 
can block consensus. Likewise, the WTO 'charter' itself provides 
a consensus requirement for amendments to Annexes 2 and 3 of 
the WTO^. Thus the opportunity to evolve by experiment and 
trial and effort, plus practice over time, seems considerably more 
constrained under the WTO than was the case under the very 
loose and ambiguous language of the GATT, with its minimalist 
institutional language.
Thus, we have a potential for a stalemate, or potential for 
inability to cope with some of the problems that will be facing 
and are already facing the new WTO institution. This requires 
exploring a possible solution in this respect. This is the focus of 
the following and final part of this article.
IV EXPLORING POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND 
DEVELOPING CONCLUSIONS AND 
PROGNOSES FOR THE FUTURE
In order to avoid the potential stalemate problem referred to 
in the previous section, various possible solutions could be 
developed. For instance, the WTO can develop somewhat better 
opportunities for explicit amendments, using the two-thirds 
(and three-fourths in substance cases) power of amendment in 
the WTO charter. By the same token, some of the decisions that 
are possible by the WTO membership at its ministerial meeting 
or various council meetings can 'creep up on' some of the issues 
and decide them in a way so that certain small steps of reform 
can be taken. These decisions will become part of the 'practice 
under the agreement' referred to in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. A third avenue can stem from the dispute 
settlement details and potential changes in procedures. In this 
respect, it may be possible to work within the 'consensus rule' 
to make some changes in Annex 2 (the DSU). It at least appears
that this does not require national government member treaty 
text amendments, and thus avoids some of the elaborate 
procedures of national government ratification of treaties, etc.
The question of such consensus relates to at least two different 
kinds of decisions: changes in the text of the DSU; and decisions 
by the DSB which could involve incidental or interstitial and 
ancillary procedural rules, assuming that they are not 
inconsistent with treaty provisions of the DSU. Intuitively, the 
consensus rule apparently applies in this context. There may be 
a few situations where basic, small and relatively unimportant 
decisions can be made as a matter of practice of the 
administration of the dispute settlement system, such as 
decisions about how to interpret time deadlines, or the form of 
complaints that should be filed, or the development of a 
relatively uniform set of procedural rules about activities of 
panels and panel members, translations, documentation, etc. 
Even then there is at least some likelihood that an objecting 
member could force an issue to go to the DSB and that member 
could dare block consensus.
With respect to larger 'new subjects' for WTO additions, 
subjects as significant, for example, as rules on investment, or 
competition policy; or even environmental rules, it appears that 
matters will be somewhat more difficult even than the 
procedural changes. If amendment of the agreements is not 
feasible, one could look at the WTO Annex 4 'plurilateral' 
agreements which are optional, and thus in the drafting process 
do not necessarily need to be subject to 'consensus'. However, to 
add a negotiated plurilateral agreement to Annex 4 of the WTO 
does require the so-called 'full consensus'. Thus once again, that 
could be blocked, and clearly that blocking opportunity will 
translate back into the negotiating process about what can be 
negotiated to be placed in such a new potential plurilateral 
agreement.
Accordingly it may be that the critical development for the 
WTO is to address 'consensus' procedures and thus give 
attention to the meaning and practice of consensus. In this 
context, it might be feasible to develop certain practices about 
consensus that would lead member nations of the WTO to 'self 
restrain' themselves from blocking a consensus in certain 
circumstances and under certain conditions. In other words, the 
General Council, or the DSB (General Council acting with 
different hats) might develop a series of criteria about consensus 
concerning certain kinds of decisions, which would strongly 
suggest to Member States that if these criteria are fulfilled, they 
would normally refrain from blocking the consensus. This 
approach could be compared to the practice in the European 
Community history and jurisprudence of the 'Luxembourg 
Compromise', where it has been understood that governments 
would refrain from exercising their potential vote against a 
measure in certain circumstances, unless the measure involves 
something of 'vital interest' to the nation members involved.
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While not pursuing the analogy too far, one might see something 
similar develop in the context of the WTO.
However, it is prudent at this point to consider what some of 
the conditions or circumstances might be to encourage nations 
to refrain from blocking a consensus on some of the more purely 
procedural reforms that might be desired, either in amending 
the DSU or in decisions of the DSB. The following might be 
considered:
uary 2000
  Firstly, the major criterion is that a proposed measure must be 
consistent with the fundamental principles of the WTO, 
including MFN, and perhaps some of the substantive 
requirements of treaty texts such as national treatment, or 
restraints on border measures. Normally, procedural changes 
ought not to be directed to challenge those particular rules 
anyway.
  In addition, the requirement of a supermajority threshold, 
such as 70 per cent of the members present, is recommended.
  And last but not least, it may be helpful in this context that the 
consideration of any new procedural measure should first be 
examined in depth by a special expert group appointed by the 
DSB or the WTO membership. This group would consist of 
considerable expertise on legal procedures and it would be 
recognised as impartial and not prone to be pushing one 
reform or another for particular advantage of the nation 
concerned. To this end, it may be useful that the members of 
the expert group should be, like panels, working and discussing 
in their own right and judgment and not on instruction of 
governments. Indeed, such an expert group might draw upon 
individuals who are not part of the diplomatic missions at 
Geneva, and in some cases not even government employees. 
The expert group could prepare certain recommendations or 
evaluate proposals that have otherwise been made, and then 
send them to the DSB, or to the WTO General Council, with 
a recommendation of adoption. Then if the other criteria 
mentioned above were fulfilled, again members would beo
strongly encouraged to refrain from blocking consensus, partly 
with the notion that in the future they may be supporting some 
other measures which likewise would benefit from restraint in 
using consensus-blocking techniques.
Turning to more substantial reforms which might be 
developed through plurilateral agreements as candidates for 
Annex 4, one might also develop a set of criteria which would be 
used to persuade nation members to refrain from exercising 
consensus-blocking techniques. For example, criteria for a new- 
plurilateral agreement that would benefit from such a developing 
practice over time (informal and not part of the treaty) could 
include the following:
  The proposed agreement would not be inconsistent with any 
of the existing other rules of the WTO and its Annexes, 
especially Annex 1 (GATT, GATS, and TRIPS). Thus, MFN 
would be fulfilled where otherwise required by the rules of 
Annex f. Other measures already embodied in the treaties 
would likewise be a requirement of consistency for the new- 
treaty agreement. It has to be emphasised, however, that the 
new plurilateral agreement proposal would sometimes contain 
measures that would call for rules applying to those accepting 
the new protocol that differ from the other WTO rules. This 
should not, nevertheless, have any detrimental impact on the 
non-members of the new protocol.
  The protocol or plurilateral agreement proposal should have 
among its proponents a 'substantial' number of members of 
the WTO. Substantial in this context should be interpreted in 
a way that makes it relatively clear that bilateral agreements 
would not be good candidates. Probably, the proposed 
protocol should include between ten and twenty WTO 
members, or alternatively the minimum number would be left 
ambiguous, as long as it was not just a few members. It could 
also be noted that smaller groups of members can enter into
regional trading arrangements, provided that these are not 
inconsistent with the other rules of the WTO, particularly 
including Article XXIV of GATT.
  The proposed plurilateral agreement should be open to 
accession by any WTO member. Possibly this ability to accede 
to the plurilateral agreement should be unconditional. That 
would mean that the proposal for a plurilateral agreement 
would have within its text all the measures to be required, 
leaving nothing further to be negotiated for accession. There 
might be some exception for a 'scheduling' type apparatus 
analogous to GATT tariff schedules or GATS service 
schedules.
  It could be required that a majority vote of the Council would 
approve the addition of the plurilateral proposal to Annex 4. 
This majority vote could be something of a supermajority, 
such as two-thirds. Other formulas for the vote could be 
envisaged.
  Since bringing a new plurilateral agreement under the WTO 
'umbrella' by adding it to Annex 4 might have some financial 
implications for the costs of Secretariat and other assistance in 
enhancing and carrying out the plurilateral agreement, an 
additional principle to avoid consensus-blocking could be that 
the financial costs of the additional activity created by the 
proposed plurilateral agreement would be carried entirely by 
the members who have acceded to the plurilateral agreement, 
under a special budget item in the WTO financial system.
Possibly with some approach like this to providing some 
constraint on the techniques of developing consensus, the risk of 
the consensus requirement creating stalemate and inability to 
evolve and cope with new problems in the global economy could 
be minimised. These criteria could be developed through 
resolutions of the General Council or the DSB, in the form of 
'recommendations to members', and might provide the 
relatively informal practice which nevertheless could be effective 
over time. If such practice was reasonably successful, it might 
achieve some of the best of several divergent policies, namely 
allowing measures to go forward short of unanimity or total
o o J
consensus, but at the same time protecting in some sort of 
ultimate and 'vital sense' the right and power of every member 
of the WTO to object in only those very few cases where it felt 
it was [so] strongly important to its vital national interest that it 
would not refrain from blocking the consensus. Clearly this must 
develop as a sort of 'gentlemen's agreement' over time, and the 
practice of this procedure in its formative period, which may 
take several years, would be extraordinarily important. 
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